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Title 回收系統中社會福利最佳化之費率制定及補助政策分析
Abstract 本計畫分析整個回收體系參與者的決策時間點,包含政府機關、消費市場以及回收市場所有參與者。政府機關為回收基金管理委員會(先行者)先釋出回收清除處理費率與處理補貼費率之訊息,責任業者與回收業者(跟隨者)接收訊息後,分別決定最佳製造量與收購金。上述兩階段政策工具能夠有效減少環境的負面外部影響,而臺灣利用兩階段政策工具運行資源回收系統已行之有年,由政府單位向相關責任業者進行課稅,提供補助給資源回收業者。現行制度應用收支平衡的概念進行回收基金的操作與管理,然而,對非營利組織而言,其應就整體系統收益做考量,因此本計畫以最佳化整體系統收益的觀點上,求取基管會所應訂定之回收清除處理費率與處理補貼費率,與現行制度比較,並擬以產業實際現況說明本計畫所得到之管理意涵。本文主要有2個貢獻:(1)系統收益最佳化的提議概念提供環保署一個訂定清除處理費與處理補貼費一個不同的方法,(2)補貼費率和回收量之間的關係於現行模式中可能造成市場的扭曲。
EngTitle The analysis of welfare-maximized tax/subsidy fee determination and subsidy impacts on recycling sys
EngAbstract This study presents a Stackelberg-typed model to determine the socially optimal subsidy and advanced recycling fees in decentralized reverse supply chains where each entity independently acts according to its own interests. Our model consists of the government, as a leader, and two followers, a group of manufacturers, importers, and sellers (MIS), and a group of recyclers. Two-part instrument (2PI), where the government taxes manufacturers, imports, and sellers (MIS) and subsidizes recyclers, plays a key role in driving or giving incentives to the flows of recycling items. The current recycling system in Taiwan considers the fund balance between the subsidy and advanced recycling fees. This study maximizes the profit of the whole system, and the government determines the advanced recycling fee paid by the MIS and the subsidy fee subsidizing recyclers when MIS firms sell or recyclers process a unit of products. This study investigates the difference in the interested performances of the system optimization model and current practice under the identical tax revenue, and draws the managerial insights by examining numerical examples in the personal computer industry in Taiwan. This research makes two important contributions to the literature: (1) the proposed concept of system maximization providing the EPA with a different tax/subsidy instrument, (2) quantifying the possible relationship between the subsidy fee and collected quantities, which demonstrates a market distortion in the current practice of the fund balance model.
ProjectYear 102
SponsorOrg 基管會
ExecutingOrg 國立臺灣大學
PublicFullVersionURL http://epq.epa.gov.tw/project/FileDownload.aspx?fid=62365